The Procedural Problem Resulting from the Distinction Between Larceny and Embezzlement - Nolan v. State by Cahn, Charles, II
Maryland Law Review
Volume 18 | Issue 3 Article 4
The Procedural Problem Resulting from the
Distinction Between Larceny and Embezzlement -
Nolan v. State
Charles Cahn II
Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.law.umaryland.edu/mlr
Part of the Criminal Law Commons
This Casenotes and Comments is brought to you for free and open access by the Academic Journals at DigitalCommons@UM Carey Law. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Maryland Law Review by an authorized administrator of DigitalCommons@UM Carey Law. For more information, please
contact smccarty@law.umaryland.edu.
Recommended Citation
Charles Cahn II, The Procedural Problem Resulting from the Distinction Between Larceny and Embezzlement - Nolan v. State, 18 Md. L.
Rev. 237 (1958)
Available at: http://digitalcommons.law.umaryland.edu/mlr/vol18/iss3/4
Comments and Casenotes
The Procedural Problem Resulting From The
Distinction Between Larceny And
Embezzlement
Nolan v. State'
The defendant was employed as office manager for the
prosecutor finance company. Payments made by the prose-
cutor's customers were placed in the cash drawer of the
office. At the end of each day a clerk, an accomplice of the
defendant, prepared a report showing daily cash receipts.
The defendant then took and put in his pocket varying
amounts of cash. Under the defendant's instructions, his
accomplice would recompute the daily reports to equal the
remaining cash.
The trial court found the defendant guilty of embezzle-
ment. The defendant appealed on the ground that the evi-
dence showed his crime to be larceny and not embezzle-
ment. On appeal, in reversing, the Court noted that a
distinction between larceny and embezzlement has been
maintained by the leading textbook authorities and early
English cases. "Goods which have reached their destina-
tion are constructively in the owner's possession though he
may not yet have touched them; and hence, after such ter-
mination of transit, the servant who converts them is guilty,
not of embezzlement, but of larceny."2 The majority con-
cluded that under the authorities cited and under the testi-
mony in the case, there was not sufficient evidence to find
the defendant guilty of embezzlement.
Judge Prescott concurred in the reversal on other
grounds, but cautioned that the reestablishment of many
of the "tenuous niceties between larceny and embezzle-
ment with which the early English cases are replete" would
embarrass many future prosecutions.3
'213 Md. 298, 131 A. 2d 851 (1957).
Ibid, 314, citing 2 WHARTON'S CRIMINAL LAW (12th ed. 1932) 1590, §1276.
8 Maryland enacted its first general embezzlement statute in 1820 (Md.
Laws 1820, Ch. 162, §2). However, under Article 15, Section 5 of the Mary-
land Constitution [9 MD. CoDEn (1957) 199] in the trial of all criminal cases,
the jury is the judge of the law as well as of fact. It was not until the
1950 amendment to Section 5, which added the phrase "except that the
Court may pass upon the sufficiency of the evidence to sustain a conviction"
that an appeal of the Nolan type was possible. Hence it was 137 years
after the enactment of an embezzlement statute in this State that the
Court of Appeals first ruled that a conviction must be reversed because
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The early rules of law required that a trespass be com-
mitted before there could be a felony. Therefore, in order
for the taking of personal property to constitute the com-
mon law felony of larceny, one of the principal require-
ments was that the property be in the possession of another.
Where a servant converted property belonging to his mas-
ter, a distinction was made according to whether the
servant had possession or custody. The rule became fixed
that property received from the master usually remained
in the master's possession, the servant securing "mere
charge or custody" of it; but that property received from
a third person for the master was in the servant's posses-
sion, and he was therefore not guilty of a felony if he con-
verted it.4
Distinctions thus drawn between custody and posses-
sion, however tenuous in appearance, were by no means
academic in effect. The requirement that a trespass be
committed made it impossible to prosecute those servants
who were given possession, as opposed to custody, of their
master's property and had converted it to their own use.5
There was available a civil action for breach of trust, but
this, quite obviously, was of little worth against most
servants.
The statutory crime of embezzlement grew out of the
need to provide penalties for these conversions resulting
from a breach of trust. During the 18th and 19th cen-
turies, with the growth in size of business organizations
and the advent of absentee ownership through corpora-
tions, such conversions by employees and agents became a
constantly recurring problem. The first general embezzle-
ment statute was passed in England in 1799 as a result of
the famous case of The King v. Joseph Bazeley.6 As a bank
teller, Bazeley had received a deposit of £100 which he put
directly in his pocket and applied to his own purposes. He
the State misconceived larceny for embezzlement. Cases indicating other
weaknesses and peculiarities of our criminal laws are now free to come
before the Court of Appeals.
'HALL, THEFT, LAW AND SocIEry (2nd ed. 1952) 35.
'3 STEIPHEN, HISTORY oF TH CRIMINAL LAW OF ENGLAND (1883) 151.
Stephen goes on to suggest that common law requirement of a felonious
taking as an essential part of the definition of theft may have been based
on the sentiment that people ought to be protected by law against open
violence, but that they could protect themselves against breaches of trust
by not trusting people - a much easier matter in simple times, when com-
merce was in its Infancy, than In the present day.
82 Leach 835, 168 Eng. Rep. 517 (1799). Prior to Bazeley's case only
some special embezzlement acts had been passed, e.g.: 9 Ann. c.10 (1710) ;
5 Geo. III, c.25 (1765) ; 7 Geo. III, c.50 (1766), dealing with servants of
the Post Office; and 15 Geo. II, c.13 (1742), with reference to embezzlement
by officers and servants of the bank of England.
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was tried for larceny and acquitted, because he, and not
the bank, had possession of the deposit at the time it was
converted.
Shortly after Bazeley's acquittal, the first general em-
bezzlement statute7 was passed. This statute applied to
servants and clerks and although it extended beyond em-
ployees of bankers, it still bore the mark of Bazeley's case.
Embezzlement statutes to cover other groups of persons in
whom the possession of personal property had to be in-
trusted followed in a piecemeal manner over the next 50
years.' These acts were finally combined in a wider form
in the Larceny Act of 1861.
Enactment of these embezzlement statutes introduced
much intricacy into the law. They were intended to make
certain definite exceptions to the general rule that where
possession of property was honestly acquired, its subse-
quent fraudulent misappropriation was not a criminal
offense. The English courts consistently refused to treat
these statutes as an extension of common law larceny, and
insisted that they were passed solely and exclusively to
provide for cases which larceny did not include.' This
maintenance of larceny and embezzlement as separate and
distinct crimes led to a long series of cases which elabo-
rately distinguished between the two. "They turn upon
discussions as to the nature of possession, which are as
technical and unsatisfactory as all attempts to affix a pre-
cise meaning to a word which has no precise meaning, must
necessarily be."'10
739 ,Geo. III, c.85 (1799).
852 Geo. III, c.63 (1812) bankers, merchants, brokers, attorneys and
other agents misappropriating property Intrusted to them; 6 Geo. IV, c.94
(1825) factors, fraudulently pledging goods intrusted to them for sale;
20 & 21 Vic. c.54, §1 (1857) trustees under express trusts fraudulently dis-
posing of trust funds; 20 & 21 Vie. c.54, §3 (1857) persons under powers
of attorney for sale or transfer of property who converted the property to
their own use; 20 & 21 Vie. c.54, §4 (1857) bailees stealing the goods bailed
to them. One further alteration in the law closely connected with the sub-
ject was made after the Larceny Act of 1861 r24 & 25 Vic. c.96 (1861)],
i.e., 31 & 32 Vic. c.116 (1868), dealing with co-partners and other joint
owners who steal property in their possession.
'2 WHARTON'S CRIMINAL LAW (12th ed. 1932) 1574, §1258, which con-
tinues:
"Hence, nothing that Is larceny at common law is indictable under
the English embezzlement statutes, and those of a similar type; and
nothing that is indictable under these statutes is larceny at common
law."
Reference is made to WHARTON'S CRIMINA LAW (12th ed. 1932) because
ANDERSON, WHARTON'S CRIMINAL LAW AND PROCEDURE (1957), which is
based on the earlier work, has omitted much of the historical detail and
because references by court and counsel in the subject case were to the
older work.
103 STEPHEN, HISTORY OF THE CRIMINAL LAW OF ENGLAND (1883) 154.
1958] 239
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Since the general embezzlement statutes were not en-
acted in England until after the American Revolution, they
are not a part of our common law. Embezzlement is there-
fore purely statutory in this country. Statutes passed in
the various states differ greatly, and a uniform view of
the law is very difficult. Generally, however, one honestly
in possession of goods, who later converts them is guilty
of an embezzlement type of offense.
Naturally the problem arises most often in the master-
servant relationship. Usually where the servant obtains
goods from the master to be used in the course of his em-
ployment under the close supervision or in the immediate
vicinity of the master, he receives only custody. When he
has considerable freedom of action with respect to the
goods granted him by the master, he obtains possession.
Where the servant receives goods for his master from a
third person, the servant obtains possession which he re-
tains until he delivers the property to the master. If the
servant sets aside the goods for the master, as by placing
them in the master's receptacle (e.g. a cash drawer) the
goods are deemed to have reached their destination and
possession is held to have shifted constructively to the
master even though he may never have seen or actually
controlled them. However, if when the servant places the
goods in the master's receptacle, he does so with the in-
tention of later withdrawing them for his own purposes,
his state of mind will defeat a shift of possession to the
master."
The question of possession may also arise when the
conversion is by a person who is not a servant. One who
receives goods as a bailee normally obtains possession. His
subsequent conversion cannot be larceny unless he had a
felonious intent to steal the property at the time he re-
ceived it, or unless the conversion occurs after the bailment
has terminated. 2 Other independent persons may obtain
mere custody; for example, one who requests change for a
bill and on receiving the change refuses to hand over the
bill."
Although in each case the distinction is clearly between
possession and custody, the facts are often so confusing and
the terms themselves so ambiguous that it is impossible to
be sure which crime took place.
1Commonwealth v. Ryan, 155 Mass. 523, 30 N. E. 364 (1892).
12 CAR & MARSHALL ON CRImES (5th ed. 1952) 489, §348.
Op. cit., ibid, 442, §319.
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In Maryland the general embezzlement statute, Article
27, Section 154, in the words of the court in State v.
Tracey:
14
"... is borrowed almost verbatim from 39 Geo. III,
ch. 85, and 7 and 8 Geo. IV, ch. 29, sec. 47. * * * Having
borrowed the law from England, where an established
construction prevails and has long obtained, it is rea-
sonable to hold, that we have adopted it with the
interpretation there accorded to it."
In the subject case, the above quoted section of the
Tracey opinion was restated, the distinctions maintained
by the early English Courts were adopted, and the convic-
tion of embezzlement was set aside on the possession theory.
This distinction between embezzlement and larceny sup-
ported by the court in the subject case has been maintained
in many jurisdictions. The books are replete with dis-
missals and reversals on the ground that the indictment or
conviction was for the wrong crime.'"
The result of this distinction has been the rise of
an obvious procedural dilemma. Whichever the offense
charged, defendants have grasped the opportunity of urg-
ing that they should have been charged with the other.'
"173 Md. 447, 448, 450, 21 A. 366 (1891).
1B Larceny conviction reversed because the facts proved embezzlement:
York v. State, 140 Tex. Crim. Rep. 199, 143 S. W. 2d 770 (1940) ; State v.
Smith, 2 Wash. 2d 118, 98 P. 2d 647 (1939) ; Morgan v. Commonwealth, 242
Ky. 713, 47 S. W. 2d 543 (1932). Embezzlement conviction reversed because
the facts proved larceny: People v. Bergman, 246 Mich. 68, 224 N. W. 375
(1929) ; Jackson v. State, 211 Miss. 828, 52 So. 2d 914 (1951) ; Phelps v.
State, 25 Ariz. 495, 219 P. 589 (1923). For two cases which illustrate the
length to which such an insistence on the distinction between larceny and
embezzlement can lead, see: Commonwealth v. O'Malley, 97 Mass. 584, 586
(1867), where the defendant, having been acquitted of larceny, was con-
victed of embezzlement only to have the second conviction set aside on the
ground that the evidence established larceny. In its opinion the court said:
"The defendant had been previously acquitted of larceny upon proof
of the same facts; and it is therefore of great importance to him, if the
offense committed, if any, was larceny, that it should be so charged."
And Nichols v. The People, 17 N. Y. 114, 120 (1858), where the defendant, a
carrier of pig iron, was acquitted of larceny for breaking the bulk, and
then convicted under an embezzlement statute intended to cover the taking
by a carrier without breaking the bulk. The latter conviction was reversed
on appeal, the majority finding that the defendant had broken the bulk
and stating:
"This case turns upon a narrow point, and no -actual injustice to
the prisoner, perhaps, would be done by affirming the judgment below;
but our decisions are precedents for future cases, and although this
prisoner may go unwhipt of justice in consequence thereof, yet we
must propound the law as we find it, whatever the consequence may be
in this particular case."
8See Justice Holmes' opinion in Commonwealth v. Ryan, 155 Mass. 523,
30 N. E. 364, 365 (1892).
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As was done in the subject case, the defendant usually
refers to an authority such as Wharton, 7 who says:
"No inconvenience can arise from the maintenance
of this distinction, since it is allowable as well as pru-
dent" to join a count for larceny to that for embezzle-
ment. But great inconvenience would follow from the
acceptance of the principle that the embezzlement
statutes absorb all cases of larceny by servants."19
The State failed to include a count for larceny in the
indictment in the subject case.2" But even if it had, the
problem is not solved by permitting indictments charging
both offenses in multiple counts so long as an election is
required at the trial or a conviction of one crime is held
to be unsupported by evidence which establishes the
other.2' Suppose the indictment had included a count for
larceny. If at the completion of the testimony, the prose-
cution had elected by mistake to pursue the count for em-
bezzlement and to save the larceny count, would not the
Court of Appeals still have reversed and required a new
trial for a larceny conviction?22 Even more interesting,
17 2 WHARTON, CRIMINAL LAW (12th ed. 1932) 1591, §1277.
The writer has been unable to find any treatment of this point in
ANDERSON, WHARTON'S CRIMINAL LAW AND PROCEDURE (1957), op. cit.,
supra, n. 9.
Is This phrase was printed in italics in the majority opinion, Nolan v.
State, 213 Md. 298, 314, 131 A. 2d 851 (1957).
19 While in the Nolan case both the appellant's brief, on page 31, and the
majority opinion cited these sentences from Wharton, neither the brief nor
the opinion included this passage from the same section:
"Yet while such is the case in principle, it is in full accordance with
the modern policy of simplication of pleading that It should be
provided by statute that if the case should turn out to be one of lar-
ceny there should be no acquittal if the evidence show the case to be
embezzlement, and 'the indictment, or bill of particulars, give adequate
notice of the offense."
1 The indictment included a count for embezzlement and a count for
larceny after trust. The trial court entered a directed verdict for the defen-
dant on the count of larceny after trust and it was thereafter abandoned
by the prosecution. (According to the Maryland Code it seems that em-
bezzlement, 3 MD. CODE (1957), Art. 27, §126, and following, especially
§129, applies to the converting servant who receives possession from a
third person for the master; while larceny after trust, Art. 27, §353,
applies to the converting servant who has received possession directly from
the master himself.)
" MICHAEL AND WECHSLER, CRIMINAL LAW AND ITS ADMINISTRATION
(1940) 545.
"On the question of whether jeopardy attaches to counts in an indict-
ment which are not given to the jury at the end of a trial, some jurisdictions
have held that the defendant waives the defense of double jeopardy by
appealing or that no jeopardy can attach until the proceedings are finally
terminated. But even if these doctrines are rejected, as they were for
federal trials by the majority of the court in the recent case of Green v.
U. S., 355 U. S. 184 (1957), probably jeopardy would not attach in Mary-
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suppose the prosecution, instead of making the election,
had allowed both counts to go to the jury, and the jury in
error had held that the defendant was guilty of embezzle-
ment, thereby implying that he was not guilty of larceny.
In that case, if the Court of Appeals later reversed the
embezzlement conviction, or if the trial court had granted
the defendant a new trial, would not the State be barred
from later seeking a larceny conviction?2"
There appears to be little justification for the continu-
ation of this procedural entanglement resulting from the
distinction between larceny and embezzlement, since the
offenses require similar treatment, the penalties are prac-
tically the same24 and the original theories of the actions
seem to have retained little of their significance.25 Judge
land since its law of double jeopardy is based entirely on the common
law pleas of autrefois acquit and autrefois convict. See Anderson v. State,
86 Md. 479, 38 A. 937 (1897), where the court held that when the jury in
the former trial was dismissed before rendering a verdict, the plea of
former jeopardy was not available to the defendant because no man is In
jeopardy until a verdict has been rendered.
2 There are very few reported cases on this subject. See 80 A. L. R. 1106;
and State v. Balsley, 159 Ind. 395, 65 N. E. 185 (1902), which held that
a conviction of larceny did not amount to an implied acquittal of em-
bezzlement where the defendant was granted a new trial; State v. Casey,
207 Mo. 1, 105 S. W. 645 (1907), where a conviction of larceny and an ex-
press acquittal of embezzlement were held to make a retrial impossible
when the larceny conviction was reversed on 'appeal; Guenther v. The
People, 24 N. Y. 100 (1861), which held that a conviction of embezzlement
where the indictment contained counts for both larceny and embezzlement
was equivalent to a verdict of not guilty of the larceny charged; and
Alexander Lithgow v. The Commonwealth, 2 Va. Cas. 297 (1822), where
the defendant was convicted on one count of larceny and -acquitted on four
counts of embezzlement and the larceny conviction was reversed on appeal,
it was held that the defendant could be tried again only on the larceny
count and not on the embezzlement counts.
Maryland Statutes: Larceny - 3 MD. CODE (1957), Art. 27, §340 ($100
or more). The defendant must pay back the value thereof, and he may be
fined not more than one thousand dollars or be imprisoned In the peni-
tentiary for not more than fifteen years, or in the house of correction or
jail for not more than ten years, or be both fined and imprisoned in the
discretion of the court.
Embezzlement - 3 MD. CODE (1957), Art. 27, §129. The defendant may
be imprisoned in the jail or house of correction for not more than three
years, or in the penitentiary for not more than fifteen years. (The amount
embezzled may be recovered by a civil action.)
21 As Judge Cardozo said in Van Vechten v. American Eagle Fire Ins. Co.,
239 N. Y. 303, 146 N. E. 432, 433 (1925), a case involving the coverage of
an automobile insurance policy:
"[W]e do not say that theft Is to be limited to what was larceny at
common law. We -assume that larceny by a bailee or a fiduciary would
be theft within the policy, though at common law It would be classified
under the heading of embezzlement. . . . The distinction, now
largely obsolete, did not ever correspond to any essential difference in
the character of the acts or in their effect upon the victim. The crimes
are one to=day in the common speech of men, as they are in moral
quality."
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Prescott stated in his concurring opinion in the subject
case:
"Probably the solution of this rather difficult prob-
lem lies in the course followed by several of our sister
States (and as was done in England) where the legis-
lative power has provided that under an indictment
for larceny, or for larceny in one count and embezzle-
ment in another, there may be a conviction of either
offense."26
In most jurisdictions where the legislature has acted to
eliminate the procedural problem resulting from the dis-
tinction between these two particular crimes, they have
done so as a part of a statute intended to minimize the pro-
cedural effects of distinctions between all types of theft
offenses. Varying approaches to this objective have been
taken by the statutes passed to date.
Massachusetts has made all forms of larceny, embezzle-
ment and false pretenses punishable under an indictment
for stealing, without further particularization of the
offense.27 The statute entitles the defendant to a bill of
M213 Md. 298, cone. op. 316, 320, 131 A. 2d 851 (1957).
9 ANNOTATED LAWS OF MASSACHUSMrs (1956):
Ch. 266, §30
"Whoever steals, or with Intent to defraud obtains by a false
pretense, or whoever unlawfully, and with intent to steal or em-
bezzle, converts, or secretes with intent to convert, the property of
another as defined in this section, whether such property is or Is not
In his possession at the time of such conversion or secreting, shall
be guilty of larceny .... "
Ibid, 9A:
Ch. 277, §39
"The words used in an Indictment may, except as otherwise pro-
vided in this section, be construed according to their usual accepta-
tion in common language; but If certain words and phrases are
defined by law, they shall be used according to their legal meaning.
"The following words, when used in an indictment, shall be
sufficient to convey the meaning herein attached to them: . . .
Stealing. Larceny. - The criminal taking, obtaining or converting
of personal property, with intent to defraud or deprive the owner
permanently of the use of it; Including all forms of larceny, criminal
embezzlement and obtaining by criminal false pretences."
Ch. 277, §40
"The court may, upon arraignment of the defendant, or at any
later stage of the proceedings, order the prosecution to file a
statement of such particulars as may be necessary to give the
defendant and the court reasonable knowledge of the nature and
grounds of the crime charged, and If it has final jurisdiction of the
crime, shall so order at the request of the defendant if the charge
would not be otherwise fully, plainly, substantially and formally
set out. If there Is a material variance between the evidence and
the bill of particulars, the court may order the bill of particulars to
be amended, and may postpone the trial, which may be before the
same or another jury, as the court may order. If, to prepare for
244
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particulars so that he may have reasonable knowledge of
the nature and grounds of the crime charged. A variance
between the indictment and the proof on account of distinc-
tions among the theft crimes is impossible under the simpli-
fied indictment. A variance between the bill of particulars
and the evidence may be remedied by the courts ordering
amendment of the bill; the court in such case may grant a
postponement of the trial. This places upon the defendant
the burden of requesting the particulars, and relieves the
state of the threat of a reversal on the grounds that the
defendant did not have sufficient notice in order adequately
to prepare his defense.
The Model Penal Code (which is at present only in draft
form), in abolishing the distinct crimes against personal
property and establishing the single crime of theft in their
place, appears to adopt a procedure similar to that of Massa-
chusetts. Section 206.6028 provides:
"An accusation of theft may be supported by evi-
dence that it was committed in any manner that would
be theft under this Article, despite particularization in
the indictment or other specification regarding the
manner in which the theft was committed, subject
only to the power of the court to ensure fair trial by
granting a continuance or other appropriate relief
where the conduct of the defense would be prejudiced
by lack of fair notice of the charge or by surprise."
Under the English Larceny Act of 1916,29 the attempt is
made to eliminate the procedural problem by allowing:
1. A conviction for larceny, if proved, although the in-
dictment charged embezzlement,
2. A conviction for embezzlement or fraudulent conver-
sion if either is proved, although the indictment
charged larceny,
his defense, the defendant desires information as to the time and
place of the alleged crime or the means by which it is alleged to
have been committed, or more specific information as to the exact
nature of the property described as money, or, if indicted for lar.
ceny, as to the crime which he is alleged to have committed, he may
apply for a bill of particulars as aforesaid."
Ch. 277, §41
"In an indictment for criminal dealing with personal property
with intent to steal, an allegation that the defendant stole said
property shall be sufficient; and such indictment may be supported
by proof that the defendant committed larceny of the property, or
embezzled it, or obtained it by false pretences."
"Tentative Draft Number 4, 82 (Apr. 25, 1955).
26 & 7 Geo. V, c.50, §44, (2), (3), (4) (1916).
1958]
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3. A conviction for false pretenses if proved, although
the indictment charged larceny,
4. A conviction for false pretenses as charged in the in-
dictment, although larceny is proved by the facts.30
However the larceny Act by itself, does not completely
solve the procedural problem, since under its provisions a
reversal still would be possible should the trial court be
mistaken in its determination of which crime is proven by
the facts. This problem, however, is eliminated by Section 5
of the Criminal Appeal Act of 190731 which permits the
Court of Criminal Appeal to substitute, for the verdict of
the jury, a conviction of another offense included within
the indictment if the court believes that the jury must have
found the facts which established the other offense.2 It is
the interaction of these two statutes which makes a reversal
of the type in the subject case unlikely in England.
The New York Penal Code, Section 1290, appears to
consolidate the various theft offenses into larceny. How-
ever, procedural entanglements have not been completely
eliminated in the cases involving false pretenses. Section
1290a requires that if false pretenses are in any way in-
volved, they must be alleged in the indictment before proof
of them will be admitted in evidence.8 3
10 The subsection on false pretenses has been adopted in Maryland. 3 Mn.
CODE (1957), Art. 27, §140.
817 Edw. VII, c.23 (1907).
MICHAEL AND WECHSLER, CRIMINAL LAW AND ITs ADMINISRATION
(1940) 547, fn. 1.
83 See People v. Dumar, 106 N. Y. 502, 13 N. E. 325 (1887), where a con-
viction of larceny was reversed on the grounds that the indictment in fail-
ing to allege false pretenses and differing from the evidence did not properly
notify the defendant in order that he could adequately prepare his defense,
and People v. Noblett, 244 N. Y. 355, 155 N. E. 670 (1927), where the prose.
cuting witness was induced to give up title to his money as a result of
false statements by the defendant, a conviction of larceny was reversed.
The Court said, at 672:
"The section includes in the definition of larceny 'every act which
was larceny at common law besides other offenses which were formerly
indictable as false pretenses or embezzlement' . . . but a defendant
must be charged with the particular offense ,the people claim he has
committed."
In People v. Lobel, 298 N. Y. 243, 82 N. E. 2d 145 (1948), relying upon
Section 1290a [PENAL LAW, §1290a] of 'the statute, the appellants contended
that the thefts were "effected" by false pretenses and, since false pre-
tenses were not charged in -the indictment, evidence to that effect was
erroneously received at the trial. On appeal, the court held that the theft
was not "effected" by the false pretenses since the owner did not intend
the appellants to have the money, and it was therefore not necessary that
they be alleged in the indictment. The dissenting opinion said that the
decision had the effect of recognizing the distinct crimes which the statute
had intended to wipe out The wording of Section 1290a was subsequently
changed from "effected" to "in the course of accomplishing, or in aid of,
or in facilitating the theft." ISee PENAL LAW, §1290a (1951) 1.
PHILLIPS v. PHILLIPS
If Maryland should enact legislation to eliminate the
procedural problem in the administration of theft offenses,
it appears that a provision similar to either the Massa-
chusetts law or the draft Model Penal Code would be the
most simple and effective choice.
CHARLES CAHN, II
Use Under Void Parol Grant Ripening Into
Easement By Prescription
Phillips v. Phillips'
Theodore Phillips and his wife filed a bill of complaint
against his mother, Mrs. Margaret Phillips, and his brother,
Vernon Phillips, to enjoin the obstruction by defendants of
a driveway on the adjoining land of the defendants, the
use of which plaintiffs claimed by prescription. The de-
fendants claimed that the use made of the driveway was
permissive and not adverse, and the Chancellor granted
the defendants' prayer for a directed verdict. From a de-
cree dismissing the bill, the plaintiffs appeal.
Mrs. Phillips and her husband, since deceased, owned
a tract of land improved by a dwelling, where they-re-
sided. In July, 1935, they conveyed Lot 20, carved out of
the tract, to Theodore and his wife. In 1941, the remainder
of the tract, Lot 18, was conveyed to Mrs. Phillips and her
son, Vernon, as joint tenants. Prior to 1935, there was an
existing driveway located on what became Lot 18, near
the dividing line between Lot 18 and Lot 20. Theodore
constructed a house and separate garage on Lot 20, and
moved in during November, 1935. He testified that at the
time of the conveyance of Lot 20, before the construction
of the garage began, his mother suggested that he face the
garage towards the existing driveway to save the expense
of a new driveway. He suggested that perhaps someday
she might sell the property and then the driveway would
be closed to him. She replied:
"'Aw fiddlesticks, you know better than that. I'll
never leave here until they. carry me off the place.
You can use that driveway and you can always use it
and nobody will ever stop you from using it, so you
go ahead and build your garage there.' "2
1215 Md. 28, 135 A. 2d 849 (1957), conc. op. 37, 136 A. 2d 862.
*Ibid, 32.
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